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How the brain constructs a coherent representation of the environment from noisy visual input remains
poorly understood. Here, we explored whether awareness of the stimulus plays a role in the integration of
local features into a representation of global shape. Participants were primed with a shape deﬁned either
by position or orientation cues, and performed a shape-discrimination task on a subsequently presented
probe shape. Crucially, the probe could either be deﬁned by the same or different cues as the prime,
which allowed us to distinguish the effect of priming by local features and global shape. We found a
robust priming beneﬁt for visible primes, with response times being faster when the probe and prime
were the same shape, regardless of the deﬁning cue. However, rendering the prime invisible uncovered a
dissociation: position-deﬁned primes produced behavioural beneﬁt only for probes of the same cue type.
Surprisingly, orientation-deﬁned primes afforded an enhancement only for probes of the opposite cue. In
further experiments, we showed that the effect of priming was conﬁned to retinotopic coordinates and
that there was no priming effect by invisible orientation cues in an orientation-discrimination task. This
explains the absence of priming by the same cue in our shape-discrimination task. In summary, our ﬁndings
show that while in the absence of awareness orientation signals can recruit retinotopic circuits (e.g. intrinsic
lateral connections), conscious processing is necessary to interpret local features as global shape.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the key functions of the visual system is to con-
struct a coherent representation of the environment. It
must identify the local features belonging to the same
object, such as edges, corners and surfaces, and bind
them together into a global percept. The human brain
accomplishes this task with astonishing ease, even under
conditions of great ambiguity, when the object of interest
is occluded by other surfaces and in the presence of dis-
tracting edges, any of which could be interpreted to also
belong to the target object. The visual system is optimized
to facilitate the extraction of meaningful information from
such noisy input [1–3]. However, one question has not
been explored in this context: to what extent does this
process of perceptual integration depend on conscious
awareness of the visual stimulus?
The answer to this question relates to another larger
question: what is consciousness for? Previous research
exploring the differences between conscious and
unconscious processing suggested that a great deal of
information about a stimulus is present in the visual
system even when participants are unaware of it. For
example, stimuli masked from awareness can produce
afterimages and contextual illusions [4,5]. Brain-imaging
experiments show that the primary visual cortex encodes
the orientation of a stimulus even when it is rendered
invisible by a mask [6]. Furthermore, extrastriate brain
regions contain a representation of complex visual
objects, such as faces and houses, in the absence of aware-
ness [7–9]. Invisible images of fearful or surprised faces
produce responses in the brain showing that not only
visual information but also complex emotional content
is conveyed by unconscious processing [10,11].
Nonetheless, the nature of an object representation
under conditions when the object is not consciously per-
ceived remains unclear. Recent studies suggest that while
patterns of voxel activity in the ventral visual cortex can
be used to discriminate responses to invisible faces and
houses, these patterns may be different from those
evoked by visible stimuli [8,9]. It has been proposed
that the representation of invisible stimuli in intermediate
visual areas is characterized by larger variability, but this
interpretation is complicated by the presence of physical
differences between the visible and invisible stimuli [9].
However, in line with this interpretation, psychophysical
experiments also indicated that, even under conditions
of equal stimulation during binocular rivalry, neuronal
tuning widths are increased when a stimulus is suppressed
from awareness [12].
One way in which conscious and unconscious visual
processing may differ is in the extent to which local
image attributes are integrated into global shape. Here,
we aimed to address this question directly with a behav-
ioural priming paradigm. Our stimulus design allowed
us to disentangle the effects of local stimulus features
compared with the representation of the global shape
(ﬁgure 1). The stimuli could be deﬁned either by
the position of elements lacking any orientation infor-
mation (experiment 1), or by only the orientation
of local elements without any positional cues (experi-
ment 2). Participants were asked to perform a simple
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ditions, we predicted that if a shape stimulus was
preceded by a prime stimulus of the same shape, discrimi-
nation performance would improve, regardless of whether
the prime was deﬁned by positional or orientation cues.
However, we reasoned that rendering the prime invisible
would allow us to distinguish whether there was a rep-
resentation of the global shape in the absence of
awareness, or whether performance beneﬁts were con-
ﬁned to local stimulus features. In a further experiment,
we tested whether priming would be observed when the
probe shape was presented at a smaller scale that would
rule out purely retinotopic effects (experiment 3). Finally,
we tested whether invisible priming was observed for
discriminating the local orientation of elements without
a global shape interpretation (experiment 4).
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Experiments 1 and 2
(i) Stimuli
All stimuli comprised eight local elements, which were
arranged in the shape of either a square or a diamond (i.e.
a square rotated by 458). Similar to a previous study [13],
our stimulus design exploited unique locations on the
shape (ﬁgure 1, centre): elements positioned at the intersec-
tions of the two shapes (white circles) must contain
orientation cues to permit discrimination of the shapes. Con-
versely, at the corners and in the middle of each side of the
squares (dark grey circles), the position of the elements is
maximally informative about the shape, while orientation
cues are ambiguous. Thus, shape stimuli could be deﬁned
by orientation cues or by position cues (see ﬁgure 1 and
electronic supplementary material for details).
(ii) Procedure
On each trial, participants were required to ﬁxate on a small
white dot in the centre of the screen for 1000 ms. Then, a
prime shape was presented for 267 ms, followed by a
500 ms inter-stimulus interval. Subsequently, a probe
shape, which could be one of the four possible stimulus
shapes (ﬁgure 1), was presented for 100 ms, after which
the screen went blank and participants were asked to respond
whether the probe was a square or a diamond. The response
was self-paced; however, participants were instructed to
respond as quickly as possible. The ﬁxation dot was present
for the entire trial until the response period. However, as an
aide to help participants know which stimulus to respond to,
during the prime presentation the dot was black and during
the probe presentation it was blue. The trial sequence of
the two types of primed trials is shown in ﬁgures 2a and 3a
(for experiments 1 and 2, respectively). After each trial, par-
ticipants received feedback in the form of a small coloured
circle (width: 0.858 of visual angle) presented at ﬁxation for
100 ms (green, correct; red, incorrect).
The prime shapes were either always deﬁned by position
cues (experiment 1) or by orientation cues (experiment 2).
Moreover, on half the trials, the prime was rendered invisible
by counter-phase ﬂickering of the stimulus contrast at
120 Hz. In half the trials, the prime and probe were the
same shape (primed trials). Within-cue priming was assumed
to occur if the prime and probe also shared the deﬁning cue.
Conversely, priming of the global shape representation must
occur for cross-cue priming (i.e. when the deﬁning cue dif-
fers between the two stimuli).
(b) Experiment 3
(i) Stimuli
Stimuli were identical to those used in experiment 2, except
that the probe stimulus was scaled to 62.5 per cent of the size
of the prime (including the wavelength/standard deviations of
the stimulus elements).
(ii) Procedure
Task and trial sequence were identical to experiment 2 except
that all primes were deﬁned by orientation cues.
(c) Experiment 4
(i) Stimuli
Stimuli comprised eight elements, all of which were Gabor
patches (i.e. orientation cues). The stimulus design ensured
that the content of local information was comparable to the
orientation-deﬁned shape stimuli of the other experiments,
while there was no global shape interpretation (see electronic
supplementary material for details).
(ii) Procedure
The trial sequence was identical to the previous experiments
except that, instead of discriminating the shape of the stimu-
lus, participants were required to distinguish whether the
orientations of the elements were cardinal or oblique. On
primed trials, the prime and probe were identical, and in
the unprimed trials, the orientation of the local elements
was changed to the opposite stimulus (e.g. from cardinal to
oblique). The position of elements was always identical in
both intervals.
Further details about participants and methods used in
all four experiments can be found in the electronic
supplementary material.
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Figure 1. Shapes could be constructed by orientation or pos-
ition cues. The shape was either a square or a diamond. At
the intersections of the two shapes (in schematic, denoted by
light grey circles), only the orientation of the element provides
shape information. At the corners and middle of the sides (dark
grey circles), orientation would be at best ambiguous and only
position information is useful for shape discrimination.
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Figure 2. Position-deﬁned priming in experiment 1. (a) Trial sequence. The prime was always deﬁned by position cues. The
probe could either also be deﬁned by position cues (within-cue) or by orientation cues (cross-cue). Shown here are primed
trials, in which the probe and prime are the same shape. In unprimed trials, the probe would be the opposite shape as the
prime. (b) The priming effect (how much faster response times were for primed relative to unprimed trials) for the four priming
conditions: visible and invisible primes, within-cue and cross-cue condition. (c) Median response time for every trial type. In
both (b) and (c), data reﬂect mean across participants, and error bars denote +1 s.e. of the mean (between-subject variance
removed). RT, response time. (b) Black bars, within-cue priming; grey bars, cross-cue priming. (c) Within-cue: black bars,
primed; dark grey bars, unprimed; cross-cue: light grey bars, primed; white bars, unprimed.
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Figure 3. Orientation-deﬁned primes in experiment 2. (a) Trial sequence. The prime was always deﬁned by orientation cues.
The probe could either also be deﬁned by orientation cues (within-cue) or by position cues (cross-cue). (b) The priming effect.
(c) Median response time for every trial type. All other details are identical to ﬁgure 2.( b) Black bars, within-cue priming;
grey bars, cross-cue priming. (c) Within-cue: black bars, primed; dark grey bars, unprimed; cross-cue: light grey bars,
primed; white bars, unprimed.
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(a) Experiment 1: position-deﬁned primes
We used behavioural priming to test whether, in the
absence of awareness, position cues can be grouped into
a representation of global form. Participants reported
whether the probe shape was a square or a diamond.
On primed trials, the prime was the same shape as the
probe. We reasoned that under these circumstances,
behavioural shape-discrimination performance should
be improved compared with unprimed trials in which
the prime and probe were opposite shapes. Crucially,
while the prime was always deﬁned by position cues, the
probe could be deﬁned either by orientation cues or by
position cues (ﬁgure 2a). If any priming beneﬁt was
observed in the latter type of trial, the cross-cue priming
condition, this must tap into mechanisms integrating
local stimulus features into a global shape percept. Con-
versely, in the within-cue priming condition, behavioural
performance may be inﬂuenced by both the global
shape representation and local features.
The shape-discrimination task was very easy, as
reﬂected by very high accuracies in all participants
(mean: 0.94, minimum: 0.81). Therefore, we did not
expect to see any considerable priming effects on accu-
racy. Instead, we posited that priming would result in
shorter response times, and in order to maximize this
effect, we instructed participants to respond as quickly
as possible. The strength of the priming effect was calcu-
lated by subtracting the median response time to
unprimed trials by that to primed trials for each partici-
pant. Thus, a positive value indicates faster responses to
primed trials. Because we were interested in whether
global priming would be observed even when the prime
was rendered invisible, we limited our main analyses to
only those participants who showed cross-cue priming
for visible primes. Seven of nine participants showed a
positive priming effect and were therefore included in
further analyses shown below, but qualitatively similar
results were obtained with all nine participants (see
electronic supplementary material, ﬁgure S1).
Figure 2b shows the priming effect we observed in
experiment 1. There was robust priming also for visible
within-cue primes (i.e. when both prime and probe
shapes were deﬁned by position cues). Importantly, how-
ever, rendering the prime invisible by reversing stimulus
contrast at 120 Hz revealed a dissociation. There was a
strong within-cue priming effect; however, we found no
cross-cue priming effect for invisible primes. In a two-
way repeated-measures ANOVA with factors awareness
(visible, invisible) and integration (within-cue, cross-
cue), there was a signiﬁcant interaction between aware-
ness and integration (F1,6 ¼ 15.06, p ¼ 0.008), but no
signiﬁcant main effects of integration (F1,6 ¼ 0.12, p ¼
0.743) or awareness (F1,6 ¼ 4.61, p ¼ 0.075).
We further explored whether the lack of cross-cue
priming we observed for invisible primes was due to a
slowing of response times for primed trials, or speeding
up responses to unprimed trials. Figure 2c shows the
median response times for all experimental conditions.
Conscious processing of the position-deﬁned prime
afforded participants with a beneﬁt speeding up their
behavioural responses (see electronic supplementary
material). Taken together, we found no cross-cue priming
beneﬁt for invisible position-deﬁned primes. Therefore,
in the absence of awareness, position cues are not inte-
grated into a representation of global form. Finally, in
an additional experiment, we conﬁrmed that our
method of rendering the primes invisible was effective
(see electronic supplementary material).
(b) Experiment 2: orientation-deﬁned primes
Next, we investigated whether the results from the ﬁrst
experiment generalize to other visual features; that is,
whether without awareness no spatial integration of
simple visual features occurs. We used the same behav-
ioural priming paradigm to test whether orientation
cues can be grouped into a representation of global
form in the absence of awareness. Participants were
again asked to report whether the probe shape was a
square or a diamond. However, in this experiment all
primes were deﬁned by orientation cues (ﬁgure 3a). As
in experiment 1, accuracy in this experiment was close
to ceiling levels (mean: 0.96; minimum: 0.87). Seven of
nine participants showed a positive priming effect and
were therefore included in further analyses shown
below, but qualitatively very similar results were obtained
with all nine participants (see electronic supplementary
material, ﬁgure S2).
Figure 3b shows the priming effect observed in exper-
iment 2. As for position-deﬁned primes, there was robust
within-cue priming by visible orientation-deﬁned primes
when the probe shape was also deﬁned by orientation
cues. Surprisingly, however, when the prime was rendered
invisible, we observed only a strong priming effect for the
cross-cue condition, that is when the probe shape was
deﬁned by position cues. There was no within-cue prim-
ing beneﬁt. In a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with
factors awareness (visible, invisible) and integration
(within-cue, cross-cue), there was a signiﬁcant interaction
between awareness and integration (F1,6 ¼ 28.67, p ¼
0.002), but no signiﬁcant main effects (awareness:
F1,6 , 1; integration: F1,6 ¼ 2.11, p ¼ 0.197).
To explore these results further, we analysed the
response times for all experimental conditions separately
(see ﬁgure 3c and electronic supplementary material).
Conscious processing of orientation-deﬁned primes is
necessary to speed up participants’ responses when the
probe is also deﬁned by orientation. More importantly,
however, our observation that cross-cue priming persisted
when the prime is invisible strongly suggests that orien-
tation information must somehow be integrated into a
global representation even in the absence of awareness.
We further conﬁrmed that rendering the primes invisible
was effective (see electronic supplementary material).
(c) Experiment 3: retinotopic speciﬁcity of priming
The previous experiment left unclear why there should be
no within-cue effect for invisible orientation-deﬁned
primes despite the fact that we observed robust cross-
cue priming. If invisible orientation cues are integrated
to activate a global shape representation, this should
theoretically afford a priming beneﬁt independent of the
cue deﬁning the probe shape.
However, the pattern of results we observed would also
be consistent with the recruitment of lateral connections
within the primary visual cortex by the invisible orien-
tation stimuli. Such lateral connections have been
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integration [14–17]. It has also been shown that, at
least in tree shrews, these connections link retinotopic
locations along an axis collinear with the orientation of
a neuron’s receptive ﬁeld [18,19], which would make
them an ideal candidate mechanism for activating neur-
ons along the borders of a global shape. However, their
involvement in perceptual integration remains controver-
sial [20,21], and it is very likely that, at least for visible
stimuli, recurrent feedback mechanisms from higher cor-
tical areas into the primary visual cortex are also involved
in these processes [22].
But neuronal activity in response to an oriented Gabor
patch, rendered invisible as in our experiment, could
spread along these connections. Perhaps this activation
aided participants in detecting the presence of position
cues in a probe shape in the cross-cue condition of exper-
iment 2. This scenario makes a prediction for what
happens if the probe shape was presented at a different
scale than the prime. This manipulation effectively shifts
the elements of the probe shape away from the retinotopic
locus of the lateral connections activated by the prime
stimulus (ﬁgure 4a). We expected to ﬁnd no cross-cue
effect for invisible orientation-deﬁned primes if priming
was indeed mediated by these retinotopic circuits.
As in the previous experiments, accuracy in this task
was very high across all participants (mean: 0.95; mini-
mum: 0.85). We only observed consistent within-cue
priming; that is, there was a beneﬁt for presenting an
orientation-deﬁned prime and the identical stimulus,
albeit at a smaller scale (ﬁgure 4b). In contrast, there
was no cross-cue effect, so priming by orientation cues
did not transfer to probes deﬁned by position cues.
Importantly, rendering the prime invisible obliterated any
priming effects. In a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA
with factors awareness (visible, invisible) and integration
(within-cue, cross-cue), there was a signiﬁcant interaction
between awareness and integration (F1,6 ¼ 10.23, p ¼
0.024), but no signiﬁcant main effects (awareness: F1,6 ¼
3.92, p ¼ 0.104; integration: F1,6 ¼ 4.61, p ¼ 0.085).
Responses to within-cue primed trials were faster than
those to unprimed trials only when the prime was visible
(ﬁgure 4c and electronic supplementary material). Taken
together, this experiment showed that rendering the
prime invisible completely obliterated the priming beneﬁt
when the elements of the probe shape were now at retino-
topic locations that did not fall on the borders of the
global shape. Thus, the invisible priming effects we
observed in the previous two experiments were probably
mediated by mechanisms acting locally in retinotopic
(or spatiotopic) space. Interestingly, since we also
observed no cross-cue priming effect for visible primes
in this experiment, even for visible stimuli the cross-cue
effects may involve at least a degree of local processing.
(d) Experiment 4: local orientation priming
Finally, we wanted to explore why no within-cue effect
was observed for invisible orientation-deﬁned primes
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Figure 4. Retinotopic speciﬁcity of priming. (a) Illustration of prime and probe stimuli. The prime was presented at a larger
scale than the probe, such that the individual elements of the probe were located outside the region where they would be
expected to fall within the reach of lateral connections in visual cortex. (b) The priming effect. (c) Median response time
for every trial type. All other details are identical to ﬁgure 2.( b) Black bars, within-cue priming; grey bars, cross-cue priming.
(c) Within-cue: black bars, primed; dark grey bars, unprimed; cross-cue: light grey bars, primed; white bars, unprimed.
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orientation-deﬁned probe shapes is essentially an
orientation-discrimination task. If the orientations of all
the Gabor patches in the stimulus are cardinal (vertical,
horizontal), the shape is a square. If they are all oblique,
the shape is a diamond. Theoretically, a participant could
therefore solve this task without any concept of the global
shape. The invisible Gabor patches of the prime stimuli in
experiment 2 were presented in the same retinotopic
location as the Gabor patches in the probes. We reasoned
that there should be no priming beneﬁt by invisible
oriented Gabor patches, regardless of whether the
stimulus had a global shape interpretation.
We tested this by modifying the procedure of exper-
iment 2. All stimuli contained oriented Gabor patches;
no position cues were used in this experiment. Instead
of performing a shape-discrimination task, participants
were required to judge whether the Gabor elements in
the probe stimulus were all at cardinal or oblique orien-
tations. We removed any global shape interpretation by
generating stimuli consisting of eight randomly positioned
Gabor patches. The orientations were consistent with
those used in the previous experiments; however, because
of the random placement of the elements, they could not
be interpreted as shapes. The locations of the Gabor
patches were randomized between trials, but within
each trial they were identical in the prime and the probe
(ﬁgure 5a).
Accuracy in this orientation-discrimination task was
very high (mean: 0.94; minimum: 0.85); therefore, we
concentrated our analysis on response times. There was
a robust priming effect when the prime was visible.
However, when the prime was rendered invisible, the
priming beneﬁt disappeared (ﬁgure 5b). This result repli-
cates the within-cue effect in experiment 2. The effect of
invisible primes was signiﬁcantly weaker than that for vis-
ible primes (paired t-test: t12 ¼ 2.2, p ¼ 0.046). In the
absence of awareness, presenting Gabor patches in the
same retinotopic location and with identical orientation
as in the probe stimulus does not afford a behavioural
advantage for performing the task. Additional analysis
showed that overall response times for visible trials were
signiﬁcantly shorter than for invisible trials (see
ﬁgure 5c and electronic supplementary material).
4. DISCUSSION
In this study, we used a priming paradigm to address two
previously unresolved questions about how the brain pro-
cesses information about a visual scene: First, how are
discrete, local features of the input from the retina
integrated into a representation about global shape?
Second, in what way do these processes depend on
whether we are consciously aware of the stimulus?
We found that invisible prime shapes could exert an
inﬂuence on participants’ performance in a simple
shape-discrimination task, as participants’ response
times were faster when the probe was the same shape as
the prime. When the prime only contained position infor-
mation, the priming beneﬁt was observed only if the
probe was the identical image (experiment 1; within-cue
priming). However, when the prime was constructed of
oriented elements and position information was ambigu-
ous as to the global shape, a priming beneﬁt was observed
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suggested that a global representation could be inferred
from the local information in the prime stimulus (exper-
iment 2; cross-cue priming). Critically, invisible primes
only exerted this effect when the prime and probe
shapes were presented at the same scale, but not when
the probe was smaller, which shows that the integration
exploits retinotopic circuitry (experiment 3). Further,
priming participants with invisible oriented elements did
not provide a beneﬁt in response times for judging the
orientation of elements presented in the same spatial
locations as the prime elements (experiment 4). Taken
together, this pattern of results suggests that invisible
oriented elements can recruit local (retinotopic) mechan-
isms for facilitating the detection of stimuli, but there
is no integration of local information into an abstract
concept of global shape.
Our ﬁndings thus reveal an important distinction
between conscious and unconscious visual processing:
in the absence of awareness, sparse visual stimuli con-
structed of a small number of local elements do not
appear to activate abstract representations of geometric
shape, regardless of the deﬁning cue. While we found
integration of local orientation signals into a global
shape representation, this representation was not invar-
iant to the spatial scale of the stimulus and thus was
constrained to retinotopic space. This indicates that con-
sciousness is necessary for recognizing even simple
objects. Moreover, since the effects we observed for invis-
ible primes were retinotopically constrained, our results
are consistent with the notion that processing within the
early visual cortex occurs regardless of awareness [4,6].
Interestingly, even for visible stimuli we found retino-
topically constrained priming when the prime stimulus
was deﬁned by orientation cues, but the probe shape
was deﬁned by position cues and presented at a different
scale. Only when both the prime and probe were deﬁned
by orientation was there a size-invariant beneﬁt of being
presented with the same shape. Even when participants
are aware of a stimulus, retinotopic mechanisms may
play an important role in activating a global shape rep-
resentation. This reveals a considerable limit of the
involvement of higher-order mechanisms sensitive to the
abstract shape in the human visual system. While there
is good evidence for the involvement of higher-level
processes in perceptual integration [20–22], our ﬁndings
indicate that during conscious processing integration
occurs through local, retinotopic and feedback
mechanisms.
How can we reconcile our ﬁndings with the obser-
vation that relatively complex stimuli, such as objects,
faces and words, can have effects on behaviour and
physiology in the absence of awareness? For instance,
presenting observers with fearful faces that are masked
from conscious awareness activates the amygdala [10].
Rendering images of faces and houses invisible through
binocular fusion by presenting stimuli with opposite
colour contrast to each eye nonetheless causes category-
selective activations in the ventral extrastriate cortex
[7,9]. Moreover, very complex and abstract information
can be represented in the brain even in the absence of
awareness [23].
One reason for this discrepancy may be that the neural
representation of at least some complex stimuli actually
differs between conscious and unconscious processing.
As previous studies have shown, functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) can reliably distinguish spatial
patterns of neuronal activity evoked by faces and houses,
regardless of whether the stimuli are visible or masked
from awareness [8,9]. In these experiments, a pattern
classiﬁer is trained to discriminate the spatial activity pat-
terns for two types of stimuli, and the trained classiﬁer is
then tested on its ability to also decode or predict the
stimulus category giving rise to independent response
patterns. Crucially, however, these studies both found
that it was impossible to generalize between visible and
invisible stimuli; that is, when the classiﬁer was trained
to discriminate visible faces and houses, it subsequently
performed very poorly when used to predict the category
of invisible stimuli. This indicates that the local spatial
pattern of activity associated with a complex visual
stimulus differs depending on whether an observer is
consciously aware of it or not, and this is consistent
with our present ﬁndings: without awareness, there is
no abstract representation of complex visual geometry,
but rather individual features are represented in isolation.
They may interact through retinotopic circuits in the early
visual cortex but are not bound into a global entity.
Moreover, the behavioural and physiological effects of
invisible/subliminal emotional stimuli, such as images of
fearful faces, are likely to involve primal mechanisms
that circumvent more complex visual processing
altogether [10,11,24]. Responses measured in the amyg-
dala to invisible emotional stimuli do not arise through
the geniculostriate pathway [25,26]. The response to fear-
ful face images relies on low spatial frequency information
[27]. The mechanisms for evoking emotional responses
are of behaviour relevance and probably evolutionarily
old. The stimuli in our study, on the other hand, com-
prised small local elements that can be interpreted as
abstract (albeit simple) geometrical shapes. This requires
higher-level conceptual processing mediated by the reti-
notopic cortex. Thus, our results indicate that a limit
for unconscious processing may lie in the integration of
limited, local information into global form.
Naturally, whenever a stimulus is manipulated in order
to mask it from conscious awareness, negative ﬁndings for
an effect of invisible stimuli can be attributed to the
stimulus rather than to the manipulation of consciousness
per se. In particular, with respect to our paradigm, it
could be argued that the fast counter-phase ﬂicker of
the stimulus is beyond the temporal limit for producing
a stimulus-associated response in the visual cortex. But
we found in the ﬁrst experiment that within-cue priming
by position information is preserved for primes rendered
invisible by this method. More importantly, in our
second experiment, we also observed cross-cue priming
by invisible orientation-deﬁned primes—that is, transfer
of the shape information inferred from orientation cues
to shapes constructed from position cues. These ﬁndings
are sufﬁcient to demonstrate that our method of
rendering stimuli invisible can still result in visual cortex
responses sufﬁcient to produce priming. This is also con-
sistent with electrophysiological evidence demonstrating
that fast-ﬂickering stimuli entrain responses of neurons
in the visual cortex [28–30]. Moreover, recent behaviour-
al experiments showed that stimuli rendered invisible by
this method nonetheless produce adaptation to oriented
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the primary visual cortex [31]. Taken together, the
absence of priming effects we found in our study must
have resulted from the failure of the stimulus to reach
consciousness, rather than it failing to produce reliable
visual responses.
What could be the neural substrates underpinning our
unconscious priming effects? Our unconsciously pre-
sented prime stimuli must leave a trace in the
retinotopic space occupied by the global shape, which
draws the observer’s attention to these locations and
thus facilitates the detection and discrimination of
subsequently presented probe stimuli. In the case of
within-cue priming by position cues (experiment 1), par-
ticipants are already primed to the locations of the probe
elements allowing them to respond more quickly than if
the opposite shape was presented. In contrast, when prim-
ing participants with invisible orientation-deﬁned shapes,
locations different from those of the prime elements—but
which were collinear with the sides of the probe shape—
were also primed, affording a behavioural facilitation for
detecting position-deﬁned probes (experiment 2).
A likely candidate circuit to mediate such effects could
be the long horizontal connections between neurons
in the primary visual cortex [14,15,17]. They have
been reported to connect neurons with similar orienta-
tion tuning across several degrees in visual space
[18,19,32,33], and have been suggested to play a role in
various forms of spatial integration [34,35]. While their
involvement in contour integration remains controversial
[20,21], it can explain the effects we observed here.
Experiments in tree shrews showed that the spread of
these connections from a neuron is not unidirectional
but tends to favour neurons that lie on a collinear axis
in visual space with the neuron’s preferred orientation
[18,19], and that these connections explain the facili-
tation of neuronal responses to collinear grating stimuli.
More recently, voltage-sensitive dye imaging in behaving
monkeys demonstrated that small grating stimuli produce
‘ﬁlling-in’ of surrounding regions, but more readily in
regions that are collinear with the stimulus orientation
than with orthogonal ones [36]. Further, there is evidence
that lateral interactions in the visual cortex are stronger
for low-contrast stimuli, suggesting more reciprocal facili-
tation [37]. Importantly, all the stimuli in our current
study were at low (but supra-threshold) contrast levels,
which further suggests a role for these connections in
our experiment. Future neurophysiological studies
should explore in how far the fast counter-phase ﬂicker
we employed here affects the activation of horizontal
connections in the visual cortex.
Finally, we also found a lack of within-cue priming
for orientation-deﬁned primes that had been rendered
invisible. At ﬁrst glance, this result may seem counter-
intuitive, because the presence of invisible cross-cue
priming from orientation- to position-deﬁned shapes
would suggest that within-cue priming (that is, priming
by an identical image) should also be observed. However,
we believe that this ﬁnding is in fact consistent with our
main hypothesis. Judging the shape of our orientation-
deﬁned probes in the ﬁrst three experiments is an implicit
orientation-discrimination task. Moreover, in our fourth
experiment, participants were explicitly instructed to
discriminate the orientation of randomly positioned
elements without any global shape interpretation.
These experiments demonstrated that invisible oriented
elements do not afford any behavioural advantage for dis-
criminating the orientations in the probe stimulus. This is
also consistent with reports of adaptation to oriented
grating stimuli rendered invisible using the same
method [31]. It is possible that the invisibly presented
oriented elements reduce the contrast sensitivity for
discriminating the subsequently presented low-contrast
orientation elements in the probe stimulus. But because
the facilitation we observed for visible primes appears to
occur through speeding up the responses in primed
trials, we believe a more parsimonious explanation is
that what must have been primed is an abstract represen-
tation of the stimulus orientation, which may be of a
semantic or at least conceptual nature. Our results suggest
that conscious processing of orientation is therefore
necessary to activate this representation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we explored the extent to which invisible
stimuli can prime behavioural performance for discrimi-
nating geometrical shapes. We found that while position
information is not integrated into a representation of
global form in the absence of awareness, orientation infor-
mation is. However, our results suggest that this spatial
integration is retinotopic, which implicates the involve-
ment of lateral horizontal connections in the primary
visual cortex being involved in this process. Our results
contribute to our understanding of visual processing by
demonstrating that such local mechanisms play an impor-
tant role in spatial integration. Importantly, we show that
when stimuli are masked from awareness, this circuitry
can mediate spatial integration and exert an inﬂuence
on behaviour; critically, however, an abstract represen-
tation of even primitive geometric information depends
on consciousness.
We thank Gideon Caplovitz for helpful comments. This work
was supported by the Wellcome Trust.
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